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According to Bresnahan! (1989, p. 1012), "firm and industry conduct are viewed 
as unknown parameters to be estimated. The behavioural equations by which 
firms set price and quantity will be estimated, and parameters of those equations 
can be directly linked to analytical notions of firm and industry conduct". 
We formulate a single equation model of bank deposit pricing behaviour under 
oligopoly using the methodological and conceptual guidelines of the existing 
studies in the literature review to determine local bank deposit pricing. 
The study reports a small but statistically significant influence of market structure 
on interest rates paid on savings deposits. Generally, these results confirm the a 
priori theoretical predictions of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
hypothesis regarding the perceived relationship between market concentration 
(market power) and firm conduct (pricing). 
The study explicitly controls for alternative sources of competitive bank funding 
by including the interbank lending rate as a regressor. 
Efficiency considerations under oligopoly have implications for social welfare and 
the paper attempts to make inferences regarding the economic welfare of 
depositors under this imperfect but realistic market structure. The outcomes have 
certain ramifications in terms of competition policy. 
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According to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, the degree of 
concentration of a market exerts a direct influence on the degree of competition 
amongst its firms. Market concentration refers to the number of firms in an 
industry and their size and market share distribution. The hypothesis posits that 
in a highly concentrated market one is likely to experience reduced competition 
and greater collusion amongst the larger firms. The SCP framework is telling us 
that highly concentrated markets confer market power on firms in that market, 
allowing these firms to raise price above marginal costs consistently and 
profitably above competitive levels. The outcome of this is increased profits 
because of greater control over price setting. 
This paper is aimed at determining the nature of the relationship between market 
concentration and pricing of consumer deposits in the South African bank 
consumer deposits market. Okeahalam (1999) established that a negative 
relationship exists between deposit instrument rates and market concentration in 
the local banking market. The results of this research will serve to discount the 
contention that short-term disequilibria could be a reason for the finding of 
negative relationships in price-concentration studies like those performed by 
Okeahalam. 
The theoretical underpinning of the research is the assumed causal relationship 
between industry structure, firm conduct and market performance of the 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework. However, it should be pointed 
out that this so-called 'structuralist approach' is challenged by the Chicago 
School argument that firm efficiencies can be shown to account for the 
concentrated market structures. 
The view of authors like Fourie and Smith (1998, 1999) is that the debate is 










based on complex technical, methodological and ideological differences that are 
embedded in the philosophy of science and the evolution of economics (and 
industrial economics) in its effort to generate a conclusive set of answers 
regarding the concentration-profit issue. The latter views can be regarded as 
qualifiers in the interpretation of results and the direction of causality. 
This study has at its foundation the theory of imperfectly competitive markets (i.e. 
oligopoly theory), and uses the intra-industry econometric methodology 
employing formal models of firm conduct. The paper starts by examining the 
institutional structure of the South African consumer deposits market in Section 2 
as background to the empirical work. This is followed by a review and critique of 
the literature on the SCP framework, its applications, and challenges in Section 
3. The methodology and data are discussed under Section 4, the empirical 












2. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING 
2.1 Market structure characteristics 
Market structure characteristics refer to the number of competitors in the market, 
their size and market share distributions. Also of importance is the type of 
product sold in the market and whether firms exercise control over the price of 
the relevant product. Barriers to entry are a further characteristic of markets to 
the extent to which it is difficult or easy for new firms to enter a market for a 
product or service. Market structures also differ in terms of the degree that firms 
compete with each other on the basis of non-price factors such as product 
features and advertising. 
Competition is not just a neutral means to other ends. Shepherd (1997, p. 135) 
states that "competition provides value in itself, even beyond the effort, efficiency, 
innovation, and fairness that it promotes". The author also points out the limits of 
competition and the potential harm it may impose. 
Oligopoly represents a market in which a few firms produce the bulk of output in 
a market with a few competitive firms representing the fringe. The total number of 
competitors in the South African banking market has averaged 38 over the period 
between 1994 and 2002. A greater number of competitors do not necessarily 
translate into greater competition especially in the event that economies of scale 
are relevant in the market under analysis. In terms of size, the so-called Big 42 
banks controlled 83.3% of total bank assets at January 2005 resulting in a four-
firm concentration ratio in terms of total assets of 83.0%. This implies a highly 
oligopolistic market that could potentially allow banks scope over price setting 
and control. 











The distribution of percentage total asset shares is shown in the fol lowing figure, 
The percentage control over assets by the Big Four is more than double the 
thumb rule of 40 0'% contro l bestowing ol igopoly power on the four large firms 
inferred by McConnell and Brue (2002 p.494). 
Figure 1 Bank total assets as a measure of bank market share 
21.1% 
1 .'.1% 
Source: SARB DI900 returns. own calculations 
A standard theoretical prediction regarding the presence of economic profits is its 
attraction of potential entrants thus competing away profits unless sustaiood 
barriers to entry and incumbents' strategies prevent it. However. it should be 
noted that regulatory capHalisation requ irements through government regulation 
pose problems for quick entry and exit strategies particularly in banki ng, 
In terms of the Banks Act it used to be required of foreign banks to take Rl 
mill ion as the mil"Hmum deposit from individuals, effectively barring these banks 
from competing in the market for consumer deposits This requirement has 










considerations to the stability of the broader financial system and the economy 
are mitigating factors generally and make the banking industry a highly regulated 
market in terms of licensing and operation requirements. Furthermore, entry 
deterrence by incumbent banks could be putting paid to greater entry whereby 
incumbents modify their strategic behaviour to deter entry by potential entrants. 
2.2 Bank pricing behaviour under oligopoly 
The Task Group on Competition in South African Banking was charged with 
investigating competition in the South African banking industry. According to the 
report (2004), commissioned by the National Treasury and the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) respectively, the leading banks' ability to maintain stable 
profit rates (return on equity), over the business cycle leaves much to be desired. 
Economic theory suggests that firms under oligopoly and monopolistic 
competition market structures have some control over the price of the product 
they sell. "The market power of an individual bank increases with the degree of 
monopoly in its market and by its size relative to the market. The greater is its 
market share, or the more concentrated is the market, the greater will be its 
control over its price and the services it offers" (Heggestad and Mingo, p.11 0). 
Banks in the local banking market have maintained a stable interest rate margin 
for a considerable period of time i.e. since the early 1990s. An increased interest 
spread may reflect market power to extract a higher margin. The interest spread 
is defined as interest income less interest expenses (Falkena et. aI., p. 23). In 
order to establish the degree of price control in the banking market we track the 
interest margin as a percentage of the value of advances. We then compare this 
with a measure for market concentration and if a close correlation is established, 
ceteris paribus, it lends support to our alternative (maintained) hypothesis that 











statistically significant More specifically. there exists a negative relationship 
between market structu re and the rates paid on consumer deposits, 
A similar pattern in terms of market power (interest margin as a % of advances) 
is observed if one were to superimpose the laller diagram onto Figure 3, Market 
power (interest margin) is high in the earl ier periods 1994-95 and declines in 
tandem with the HHI from 1997-2000. Thereafter we see a rise in margin as a 
percent of advances when the HHI stat1s increasing agam to pre- 1998 levels. 
Figure 2 
6,OC"';' 
Interest rate spread and interest margin: South African banks 
Source: Competition in Banking Report 
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Source: SARB DI900 returns, own calculations 
The characterisation 01 the local banking mar1<et as oligopolistic and that this 
gives nS8 to mar1<et power Imphes that we nave to confront the theory with data 
and test th iS assertion The testable impticafion for pflClng behaViour by South 
Alncan banks suggests that conduct (seltlng the pnme rale. deposit rales. or the 
interest margm) IS possibly !e lated to market structure. Market structure. haVIng 
been cha.acterised as ohgopollsbc, and the Inferences regarding p ieing 
practices fottow n9 from ohgopol Sl ,e market structUfes In terms of the SCP 
trameworl<.. are tested in Ihis paper_ 
The study employs pooled lime senes cross-sect ion (PTSCS) data from Ihe local 
banking Indust ry. The study by Okeahalam employed monthly obS€lvalions over 
the penod 1997-99. which renders it SlIscephble to the critic ism by tile Chicago 
School about the relationshipS reflecting short-run diseqUllibria_ Our observations 











3. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Price-concentration vs profit-concentration 
Structure-conduct-performance (SCP) studies can generally be divided into two 
groups according to the measure of performance (or conduct) employed. The 
first group uses some measure of the price of certain banking products and 
services in order to capture the performance of a firm, while the second group 
uses some kind of profitability measure, such as return on assets (ROA) or return 
on equity (ROE). 
Profit-concentration studies are however extensively plagued by measurement 
and interpretation problems, this is because profits include both prices and costs 
in their measure. Therefore, the findings of statistically significant causal 
relationships between market structure and profitability could either be explained 
by market power reflected by pricing behaviour (increased prices) and/or superior 
efficiency (lower costs). The residual of prices and costs which in banking pricing 
studies represents the interest margin, can also be employed as regressand to 
test the paradigm. 
Price-concentration studies on the other hand are widely thought to overcome 
these problems because prices are not subject to the many accounting 
conventions that generally complicate studying profits. These studies explain 
pricing behaviour and exclude superior efficiency and thus the efficient structure 
hypothesis as an explanation. However, according to Brewer and Jackson (2004, 
p. 1) the omission of firm-specific variables which may systematically affect the 
cost or demand for deposits could be problematic. 
The separation of possible determinants of bank performance through the price-
concentration approach leaves much to be desired as well. According to Evanoff 











accounted for as an explanatory variable". Clearly, what the price-concentration 
theorists have been leveling as a criticism at profit-concentration studies has not 
been resolved since most studies hardly account for the costs of multi-product 
and thus multi-cost industries like banking. 
Heggestad and Mingo (1976, p.107) contend that by considering only one price 
for multi-product firms like banks, price-concentration studies may well be 
underestimating the total impact of market power on bank performance. These 
authors hold the view that non-price competition may be as important as price 
competition or that non-price dimensions may best be reflecting competition in 
the banking market because regulation and tradition within the banking industry 
work toward the substitution of non-price for price competition (ibid). Non-price 
competition can be in the form of advertising spending and research and 
development or technology spending. However, non-price competition is very 
difficult to control for in studies on the determinants of market performance. 
An examination of the main strands in the literature3 and the evolution thereof 
shows that the SCP paradigm was the dominant paradigm in industrial 
organisation from 1950 until the 1970s. The 1960s witnessed many broad cross-
section econometric studies4 that tried to establish a relationship between some 
measure of market structure and firm behaviour or market performance. This 
continued through the period 1970-1990 and up to the present in the form of the 
New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) industry-specific studies. 
New industrial organisation (NIO) theory developed from the theoretical models 
of game theory. This rigorous theoretical modelling of market conduct placed less 
emphasis on empirical testing (Fourie and Smit, 1998). According to Shepherd 
(1997, p. 29), "although game theory models are rigorous, they often have limited 
relevance for real competitive processes in real markets". On the other hand, 
3 This section is based on the discussion in William G. Shepherd (1997) 











Bagwell and Wolinsky (2000), in a general assessment of the contribution of 
game theory to the field of industrial organisation contend that important 
developments in game theory generated new insights to the substance of 
industrial organisation. The authors are of the view that "many of the insights 
offer a better qualitative understanding of important aspects of actual market 
behaviour" (ibid, p.41). 
Furthermore, "cautioning against conclusions that the game theoretic approach 
provides consistently superior quantitative predictions, they believe that the 
framework has enabled regulators to think more thoroughly about the 
consequences of a merger". It must therefore be considered that game theoretic 
models complement the policy analyst's toolkit of models available in evaluating 
market structure characteristics on firm conduct and performance and the 
possible effects of proposed mergers on competition on industry sectors and the 
economy as a whole. 
The NeW-Chicago school analysis is essentially a defence of the efficient-
structure hypothesis and a positive analysis of monopoly or concentrated market 
structures. The efficient structure hypothesis states that greater efficiency gives 
rise to greater market shares for the more efficient firms and that high market 
concentrations is the outcome observed for more efficient industries. 
Contestability theory emerged during 1975 to 1982 and focused on free entry 
arguing that entry conditions mattered more than existing monopoly. This 
literature challenges the methodology and conclusions of the SCP framework 
and the contention is that the feature of markets like barriers to entry determines 
performance and market structure is not an independent determinant of 
competition (Gilbert, 1984, p. 628). Contestability theory is premised on the 
concept of free entry and exit by potential entrants, probably lured by the 











Baumol (1982, p. 2), one of the pioneers in the field, contends that "the analysis 
provides a generalisation of the concept of the perfectly competitive market and 
is generally characterised by optimal behaviour and yet applies to the full range 
of industry structures including even monopoly and oligopoly". To the extent that 
real world markets approximate the perfectly contestable market model and is 
explained by the theory implies that it will make for a very compelling model. 
According to Baumol, "perfect contestability serves as a benchmark for desirable 
industrial organisation which is far more flexible and far more widely applicable 
than the one currently available". The defining characteristic of a perfectly 
contestable market "is one in which entry is absolutely free and exit absolutely 
cost less" (ibid, p. 3). 
However, according to Shepherd (1995, p.302) there are "three highly restrictive 
assumptions" underlying this theory by Baumol and colleagues, these are: 
• Entry is free, without limit. This implies that any entrant induced to enter, 
can instantly duplicate and entirely replace any existing firm, even a 
complete monopolist. 
• Entry is absolute to the extent that the entrant can establish itself before 
an existing firm makes any price response. 
• Entry is perfectly reversible - exit is perfectly free, at no sacrifice of any 
cost. Sunk costs are strictly zero. 
Clearly these assumptions are very restrictive and can hardly hold up in reality. 
Shepherd pointed out the mutual inconsistency in the first two assumptions in 
that "entry cannot be both trivial and total". This is true to the extent that if entry is 
trivial, then it has no force. On the other hand if entry is total, the incumbent(s) 
will respond to protect their turf and profits (ibid). There appears to be a 












The contention by Baumol on the flexibility of the model does not seem to be 
realistic in light of the criticisms leveled by Shepherd. However, as much as 
game theory generated new insights to the substance of industrial organisation, 
the contribution made by contestability theory should not be discounted either 
notwithstanding the limitations of the assumptions. 
The SCP framework is still used extensively in competition analysis in sectors 
and industries in many countries to determine whether firm mergers and 
acquisitions are in the public interest and the economy. Therefore, the SCP 
paradigm is still highly relevant for its less restrictive assumptions and practicable 
approach and being grounded in the economic theory of market structure. 
3.2 Critique of empirical tests of the SCP hypothesis 
However, the SCP framework is plagued by weaknesses that give rise to 
challenges relating broadly to causality and interpretation, methodological 
approaches and the ideological beliefs of the different schools of thought. At a 
fundamental level the criticism of the SCP hypothesis, to paraphrase Fourie and 
Smith (1999, p. 37) "was growing unease at the lack of theoretical rigour that had 
characterised much of the SCP programme. There was a sense that many of the 
specification problems were caused by models being based more on informal 
inference than formal derivation of the hypotheses from first principles". As a 
result, the numerous studies conducted to determine the relationship between 
market structure and firm performance did not shed much light on the nature of 
the assumed relationships. The SCP framework was also challenged due to both 
measurement and conceptual (causality and interpretation) issues. 
There is however a strong theoretical basis for the use of the SCP framework 
according to Heggestad (1984, p.646). "Increases in concentration, ceteris 
paribus, increase the ability of firms in the market to achieve and maintain the 











approaches monopoly, performance diverges from the competitive norm. Prices 
and profits increase. Firms become less sensitive to market forces." The author 
contends that this "collusive cartel model is well grounded in economic theory", 
the contestable markets model is also a compelling alternative explanation of the 
relationship between market structure and firm performance. 
3.3 Conceptual, measurement and interpretation issues 
Here follows a treatment of the different issues that still plague studies of the 
SCP framework. 
Gilbert (1984, p. 629) contends that "greater weight should be given to the results 
of those equations with the fewest measurement and conceptual problems when 
forming an overall impression about results". This is because results of bank 
market structure studies do not consistently support or reject the maintained 
hypothesis that market concentration influences bank performance. 
Technical issues relating to measurement problems, interpretation and direction 
of causality in the interrelationships between economic variables are very 
important. Measurement problems relate to the appropriateness of the validity of 
using measurements of profitability to infer market power (Church and Ware, p. 
432). Because market power is usually measured by relative markup of price 
above marginal cost (P-MC > 0), a better measure would have been the Lerner 
index which measures the relative markup of price over marginal costs. The 




This index requires information on marginal costs of production which is not 











problem. This critique does not have a direct bearing on our study. This is 
because we do not employ profitability data since the study is not attempting to 
establish a direct relationship between concentration and profitability. The 
problem is circumvented because we follow the direct estimation of market 
conduct approach. 
"The other measurement problem associated with SCP studies is market 
definition. While there is considerable agreement on the latter there is less 
consensus on the implication of inappropriate market definition for the validity of 
the estimations on the effect of concentration on market power" (ibid, pp. 432-
438). It should be noted however that this study focuses on a product market with 
clear geographic dimensions and well-defined measure of so-called market 
power, namely deposit prices. 
Conceptual criticisms of the SCP hypothesis relate to the interpretation of results 
amongst others, e.g. whether empirical tests of the SCP represent long run or 
short run relationships. It is not necessarily the case that firms and/or industries 
in cross-sectional estimations are in long term equilibrium (ibid). Because "any 
profitability measure implies a corresponding difference between price and 
average cost, a causal relationship running from concentration to profitability can 
either operate through an effect on price (the usual interpretation), or on average 
cost, or, of course both" (peltzman, p. 229). This implies that interpretation is 
unclear in profitability-concentration relationships, and so is the nature of the 
assumed causality. It therefore raises the question of the assumed exogeneity of 
the market concentration variable; as a result, one can pose the question 
whether it is not conduct that affects market structure? 
Berger and Hannan (1989) in a study of the price-concentration relationship in 
the US banking market found strong support for the SCP paradigm. They tested 
a specification in which some measure of market concentration is exogenous and 











in basis points and concentration ratio in percentage points; they also used both 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index and three-firm concentration (CR3) ratio 
respectively as proxies for market structure. The estimations were performed 
using ordinary least squares (OLS). It is a joint hypothesis test of the SCP and 
efficiency-structure hypothesis which rejects the null hypothesis of market 
concentration having no effect on bank behaviour regarding deposit rates paid 
that reduce consumer welfare. 
However, Jackson III (1992) in a comment on the findings by Berger and Hannan 
questioned the results of their study. He questions "whether the negative price-
concentration relationship is consistent over the full range of observed values of 
market concentration". The latter concerns possible (mis) specification of the true 
price concentration relationship. Also, according to Heggestad and Mingo (1976, 
p. 110), "economic theory does not indicate the appropriate functional form for 
the relationship between market structure and performance". It therefore follows 
that misspecification of the true relationship between prices and concentration in 
banking will raise a challenge to the validity of the results and thus for the SCP 
as a framework for developing bank regulatory policy. 
In their findings of a statistically significant relationship between market 
concentration and prices or services for household customers in commercial 
banking and notwithstanding their foregoing comments, Heggestad and Mingo 
contend that the linear form is one of the best performing functional forms in 
terms of the t-ratios and F-statistics (ibid, p.111). Edwards (1964) similarly found 
a statistically significant relationship between market concentration and business 
loan rates and the level and flexibility of loan rates. His findings are that loan 
rates are higher in highly concentrated markets than in less concentrated 
markets and also that these rates are less flexible in relatively concentrated 
markets (ibid, p.300). Loans are the converse of deposits and these findings are 











3.4 Ideological issues 
Ideological beliefs rooted in the efficacy of the market and the role and purpose 
of the state that have dogged schools of thought for ages also characterise the 
debate (ibid, p. 33). Some theorists (Chicago School) question the validity of the 
SCP hypothesis on the basis of 'market discipline' rendering the prevalence of 
economic profits not feasible in the long run. Imperfect markets, the conception 
thereof and the consequences arising from that are at the heart of the matter. 
The argument is that economic profits attract potential entrants, these entrants 
then "discipline" incumbents by charging less or offering higher deposit rates. In 
the long run, therefore, economic profits are zero and competitiveness prevails. It 
should be noted, however, that structural barriers to entry and exit precludes this 
argument. It could be the case that abnormal profits are possible because of 
entry barriers (see Section 2.1 for a discussion). 
A challenge to the interpretations and findings supporting the SCP paradigm5 is 
the efficient-structure hypothesis by Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977) 
amongst others. Demsetz contends that efficient firms obtain greater market 
share based on both price (production) and non-price (marketing) dimensions. 
Concentrated market structures are therefore efficient market structures as a 
result of the competitive processes at play. Peltzman in principle supports this 
view especially regarding the relationship between profits and concentration. He 
concludes that an eclectic view is more consistent i.e. profitability could be an 
outcome of both market structure and efficiency but he leans more towards 
efficiency effects (ibid, p. 262). Brown (1982) also finds support for this view, with 
a positive statistically significant relationship found between profit rates for 
relatively larger banks and market concentration. There is an absence of this 
same relationship in the case of smaller banks (Gilbert, p.628). 











Okeahalam (2002, 2003) studied the local (South African) and common 
monetary area (CMA) banking markets to determine the relationship between 
market concentration and pricing of consumer deposits. The Okeahalam study 
also tests the conventional specification in a joint hypothesis formulation. 
Because pooled data was employed as in our tests, there is likely to be some 
correlation in the error terms which gives rise to biased estimates. 
3.5 Summary of literature review findings 
The relevance of these studies is that they inform this research to a great extent. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the challenges to the SCP raised here 
blight all these studies to some degree therefore the results obtained are subject 
to the critique. The research reviewed here should not be regarded as exhaustive 
since studies of relationships in the banking industry in particular are numerous 
in the US market. 
The explanatory variables used are not all common to all studies and it raises the 
specification problem and thus the criticism regarding the lack of theoretical 
rigour. The main specification problems are those of commission (including 
irrelevant explanatory variables) and omission (omitting relevant variables). The 
functional form of the relationship has been questioned by amongst others 
Jackson III (1992) and Heggestad and Mingo (1976) and the possible 
specification problems emanating from that. Also, the nature of assumed 
causalities, that it is market structure influencing firm behaviour is a questionable 
proposition. The contention here is that firm conduct could equally determine firm 
market share and market structure respectively. Lastly, another view held by the 
so-called Chicago School is that the observed relationships could be a result of 












A bank price-concentration relationship is formulated under the methodological 
guidelines of the existing studies in the empirical literature review. The studies by 
Berger and Hannan (1989) and Lloyd-Williams et. a!. (1994) in particular are 
used as benchmarks to expose the existing views on the price-concentration 
relationship for the purpose of basing the model by outlining the conceptual 












4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
4.1 Model specification and testable hypothesis 
In the empirical study, we pool data for different bank-specific and industry-wide 
variables respectively for local banks between 1993 and 2002. The SCP 
hypothesis can be tested by estimating the following reduced form following 
Berger and Hannan (1989): 
y = dx + b'Z + e 
~ Itt It (1 ) 
Where Yit is the rate paid by bank i at time t on negotiable deposit instruments 
within banks ls geographic market; Xt measures market concentration in the 
industry at time t, Z is a vector of controls, and eit a random error term. The 
equation says that ceteris paribus, the rate paid on deposits by banks offering 
deposit instruments, is a function of the market concentration of total market 
retail deposits. It is also defined as a function of market per capita income, total 
bank assets, and the wage bill of the financial services sector as a proxy for cost. 
In order to take into consideration interbank funding as an alternative source of 
competitive cost funds, the interbank lending rate is included in the regression 
analysis6 . 
In this analysis, these firm-specific or market variables are the local financial 
services wage (WAGES), average per capita income (PCINC) in the local 
banking market, total assets controlled by each bank (TA), total growth of market 
deposits (DEPGRO), and the interbank lending rate (JIBAR) respectively. The 
following hypotheses are tested: 
6 The interbank lending rate was included as regressor to account for the liquidity requirements of 
banks other than the SARB accommodation and therefore reflects the cost of alternative 











The null hypothesis (Ho) states that the effect of market concentration (XI) is 
immaterial, in terms of statistical significance, to the rate that banks pay 
depositors. The alternative hypothesis (H 1) on the other hand states that greater 
market concentration gives rise to lower deposit rates all else equal. 
"The independent variables reflect either the market demand for bank services or 
internal conditions that may be expected to influence the desire of the bank to 
compete for household deposits or loans" (Heggestad and Mingo, p. 110). 
Demand conditions in the market and the supply of deposit funds respectively 
are represented by per capita income as well as total market deposits growth. 
The greater is per capita income the higher will be the demand for (and the 
equilibrium price of) deposit instruments. The greater is market growth and thus 
the supply of deposit funds, the higher or lower could be the rate paid. 
The following equation is estimated to test the hypothesis for the local banking 
industry: 
4.2 Methodological challenges 
In the South African case there exist no local geographic markets for the banking 
industry that are demarcated in terms of legislation. For example, in the US, per 
capita income varies across states and so does growth of market deposits. Most 
importantly, the four-firm concentration ratios differ because they are determined 
for these local markets or statistical metropolitan areas (SMAs). 
According to Lloyd-Williams et. al. (1994, p. 440) "this poses a problem for the 
researcher who wishes to study the SCP paradigm for individual countries 











An important point here is that the exogenous variable is quarterly time series 
data, the latter implies that there are no separate market concentration measures 
for different local geographic submarkets. Lloyd-Williams et. aI., in a study on the 
Spanish banking sector encountered a similar problem in terms of a single 
banking market. The Spanish banking market is fairly similar to the South African 
banking market with a few commercial banks dominating retail banking followed 
by some savings banks. The so-called 'Big Seven' control over 80 percent of 
private bank assets (ibid, p. 434). The problem is countered by pooling the data 
i.e. estimating pooled time series cross-section regressions. 
The study pools data from eight South African banks over the period 1993 from 
2002 using both market-wide and firm-specific variables. 
4.3 Data description and sources 
This section discusses the data and sources utilised in the study and the caveats 
and complexities that plague these matters. The relevant product market for 
which data was sought was the retail/consumer deposits market. Quarterly 
observations of the interest rate paid on a number of deposit accounts held with 
commercial banks were obtained from financial publications for the first quarter of 
1993 to the first quarter of 2002, giving 37 data points in total. Two different types 
of deposit account data were obtained for those banks that offered the product: 
the interest rate on 32 days notice deposit accounts and the twelve month fixed 
deposit instrument. Our sample includes banks which offered these types of 
accounts over the period under observation, there were eight banks which 
quoted rates for the 32 day notice deposits and 12 month fixed deposits account 
respectively. 
In terms of the 32 days notice deposit account, the quoted interest rate applies to 
amounts in excess of R1 000-00, the two different rates paid by the quoted banks 











Market structure is proxied by some measure of concentration, here the CR4 
ratio and HHI resp€ctive ly It comprises of quarterly data on the four-firm 
concentration ratio (CR4) in terms of consumer deposits. The CR4 is a measure 
of the proportion of total consumer deposits held by the four largest firms relative 
to total market consumer deposits_ The four largest banks in the country both by 
total asset value and total value of market deposits are the so-called Big Four 
which comprises ABSA. Standard Bank, FNB and Nedcor respectively. The CR4 
averaged 80 percent of total market deposits and greater over the period. 
A better measure of market corocentration is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
(HHI) used by comp€tition authorities to decide on mergers and acquisitions and 
the effects these may have in terms of consumer welfare. According to Church 
and Ware i2000. p. 429) "concentration rat ios do not adjust. as the HHI does, for 
variation in firm size'. The HHI reflects both the distribution of the market shares 
of the top firms and the composition of the market outside the largest firms. In 
addition, the HHI has a strong point: it ref lects market dominance appropriately 
with very high HHI values The latter makes it particularly useful in competition 
analysis 
Table 1 Variable descriptions 
Variable name Description 
ND32 32-day notice deposit instrument 
FDt 2 t 2 month fixed deposit instrument 
CR4 Four-firm corocentration rat io 
HHI Hirschmann-Herflnadahllndex 
WAGES Average monthty salaries and wages - finarocial services 
PCINe Local market per capita income 
DEPGRO Growth of total banking market deposits 










Other explanatory variables that were found in previous tests to explain variability 
on interest paid are also included. These variables are total bank assets, the 
local financial services wage, bank market deposits, and market per capita 
income. 
The data, including gross domestic product (GOP) and population estimates, 
were obtained from the SARB Quarterly Bulletin through Time Series Explorer ®. 
The SARB Bank Supervision Department Banks' 01900 Returns is the source of 
information on total assets, deposits, and the derived concentration ratios. 
Wages, per capita income, and market structure variable are quarterly series 
respectively because there is no geographic market or sub-market data. 
4.4 Descriptive statistics and data transformations 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the variables employed in our analysis, 
it summarises a few key statistics for each variable. ND32 is the 32 day notice 
deposit account rates offered by banks for funds deposited with them on which 
notice of withdrawal can be given over a 32 day period. These funds can then be 
withdrawn after expiration of the notice period. FD12 refers to an account where 
a fixed amount of money equal to or exceeding a predetermined minimum 
amount, is held with the bank over a twelve month periods agreed to with the 
deposit-taking institution. The 32 day notice deposit account paid on average 
11.36% between 1993 and 2001 whereas the fixed deposit accounts paid 12.1 % 
on average over the period. The interest increases as the length of the deposit 
period increases. The average CR4 ratio is 80.45% over the period, implying that 
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In terms of the SCP paradigm, this high concentration of dep3sits held by a few 
firms could result in them having greater control over prfces, resulting in price-
setting that is adverse to the consumer. Furthermore, mean market share is 
10,7%, HHI 0.183 and the growth rate of market deposits 1.75% overlhe period. 
Statistics such as the mean value of al l observations, median, standard deviation 
and the normality of distribution of the data, are reported in Table 2 
Figure 4 is a graphical depiction of the movement of interest rates paid by bankS 
on a particular deposH account on deposit fundS for the period between 19930t 
and 200201. The peak observed between t998 and 1999 ranging between 16,0 
and 20,0 percent can be attributed to the relatively higher money market interest 
rates as a result of the Asian currency crisis that hit quite a few developing 
countries. 
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In the different panes of Figure 5 are the time series of the structure varia~es 










(DEPGROl. and wages (WAGESi respectively The vanable WAGES IS highly 
seasonal and fo llowing seasonal adjU S! ll1enl. tr.e last pane 01 Figure 5 
(WAGESSA) depicts the seasonal ly ad justed series. 
Figure 5 Exogenous variables and explanatory variables 
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5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Estimation and results 
We performed relatively simple common coefficient tests for the pooled time-
series cross-section estimations using the OLS regression technique, these tests 
disregard the time and space dimensions of the data (Gujarati, 2003). We 
assume constant coefficients across both time and units and that the intercept 
does not vary either. This interpretation clearly ignores the specific nature of each 
firm and is thus a very na·ive and simple approach to this complicated data 
design. However, given the highly restrictive assumptions that assume that the 
slope coefficients of the independent variables are identical for all units, we still 
make qualified inferences as per the usual interpretation of such regression 
output in individual time-series or cross-sectional designs. The analysis was done 
using Eviews 5.0 ® statistical software package. 
The critical values for deciding whether to reject or accept the null hypothesis is 
based on the 95% confidence interval t-statistics critical value (tcrit > 1.96). This 
implies that the statistic is in the rejection region if it exceeds the critical value, a 
t-statistic smaller than this critical value implies that we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient is statistically insignificant. "A statistic is said to be 
statistically significant if the value of the test statistic lies in the critical region, in 
which case the null hypothesis is rejected" (ibid, p. 131). When we reject the null 
hypothesis it implies that our finding is statistically significant. 
Based on our strong a priori or theoretical expectation grounded in the SCP 
paradigm, we suspect that the deposit rate paid by banks should be declining 
due to market structure effects. This implies a so-called one-sided alternative 












5.2 Regression diagnostic tests 
The two main diagnostic tests that were performed were for serial corre tation of 
the error term (autocorrelation) and heteroskedasticity respectively. Estimators 
based on regressioll plagued by these problems are inefficiellt in the class of 
such estimators (ibid. p. 442) , According to Gujarati (p. 442). "autocorrelation 
may be de/Illed as correlatioll between the members of a series of observations 
ordered in time (as in time series data) or space (as ill cross-sect ional data), In 
the regression context, the classical linear regression model assumes that such 
autocorrelation does not exist in the error terms", Verbeek (2004, p_97) states 
that "autocorrelation normal ly occu rs only when using time series data" 
Heteroskedastlcity is when the error terms appearing in the population regression 
function have unequal variances meaning that these error terms are mutually 
uncorrelated, ''This problem is frequently encountered in cross-sect ional models" 
(ibid pp, 82-83), 
We used the Du rbin-Watson (OW) stat ist ic of the regression output to test for the 
presence of autocorrelation using the cri tical values to determine whether 
positive or negative autocorrelalloll exists, The Durbill-Watsoll tests, based on 
the DW statist ic of the regression, point to the presence of positive 
autocorrelation of the error terms based on the following decision criteria' 
Table 3 Durbin-Watson d test: Decision rules 
Null hypothesis Decision If 
No positive autocorrelation Reject 
No positive autocorrelation No deciSion 
No negative autocorrelation Reject 
No negative autocorrelatlOll No decision 
No autocorrelation, posit ive or negative Do not reject 
Source: Gujarati (2003,p. 470) 
0< d <de 













The null hypothesis is rejected when the decision rule IS satisfied, the null 
hypothe~s states that there is no positive autocorrelation, implying that if we 
reject then posi tive autocorrelation is present. However, it should be noted that 
whenever we add the Interbank lending rate as regressor, then the Durbin-
Watson test shows no autocorrelat ion, positive or negative 
Furthermore, a plot 01 the residuals against the lagged residuals (Figure 6 below) 
also exhibits a pattern that implies the presence of positive autocorrelation of the 
error terms, 
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Testing for heteroskedasticity is a more complicated exercise and a graphical test 
(Figure 7 below) was performed to determine the presence or absence thereof 
The correction mechanism employed to account for both autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity is seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation method 










exogenous and the errors are heteroscedastic and contemporaneously 
correlated, 
Figure 7 Scat\erplot of squared residuals vs X: test for heteroskedasticity 
= -
o • 
74 00 84 
CR4 
The diagram above is a plot of the reSiduals from one regression the squared 
residuals were plotted against one of the independent variables i e. the four-firm 
concentration ratio (CR4) According to GUJarati (p. 403), the pattern observed is 
one of a number of patterns that is associated with the presence of 
heteroskedastic error terms. 
Table 4 below contains the results of the pooled regress'lon estimations. The 
exogenous variable is CR4 for the first set of regress ions (1 ') and HHI for the 
second set (2") respectively This repeated exercise employing two different 
measures for market concentration demonstrates the robustness of the 
estimates The resutts are pretty much consistent between the two different 










Table 5 repeats the procress but in trying to account for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity, employs the so-called seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
methodology to correct for these phenomena and ensure that the estimators thus 












H~ 1002' -28.78' -79.2!)' ·2131" 
(1 1 93) (6099) (13.01) 110.11) 
WACESSA -<l.2lY -a.on' <J.1 96" -0.079' -{I.ZlT" .() 07:1- .().2:Ql- -{lOTI' 
(0015) (MOS) (Om i'} ro.015) (a.oll) 10.010) (0.019) (0.0 1 7) 
peINe 0235" 0.029" a 2'36' O.{I54' 0.196" 0013 ',.,0 0039" 
(O.02~ 1 (O.Olll (().O26) 10.023) (O.02~) (O.013j (0.026) (0 (23) 
O£PGRO ·2274 ' ·4.37" ·19 53' -5.45 -21 60' -3 60 -18.86" ""'68 
(4.6~) (2.2~ i :5.10) (~.OO) :4 .66) (5.13) 
" ·5621:: .(17' ·544(·07' ·1.16(.()7 -1 0!IL-(l7 -5.66l: '()7' '1.19E·Q7 :1.87E-07} ! (l.04E-{l7) :1.89E-(l7j (2.06(-01) 
JIBAR 












,1426 1) (464 .7) (732111 (9J2.1) 
CR. -43.33' -15.97" 11.73' 
(15. 17) (5 131 (1585) (7_86) 
H~ -6&.50' · 13.86' -65.07" '10.35 
(2253} i7 .• m (2".00) (11 27) 
WAGESSA ·0 113" -0067' -0.186' -{1061 ' -(l189' -0066' -0 133' -oO~· 
{O.03C} (O.li1I) (O.OZ9} (0.016) (D.03S} 10.012) (0 roS) iO•0 181 
""~C 0214' 0.016 0209" 0048" 0191' 0010 0,163" OO:W· 
!OW") (O.O I!») (D.045} (0.1125) (O.033j (0.015) (0.047) (0.02-1) 
OEPcno -1 942" '" · 1914 ' -4.B5 -18 7or -3.07 18 fiG" '" (9.60) (294) (9.02) (9.49) (8 uJ 












According to Bresnahan, the central inference in the stylized model is about firm 
and industry conduct: the goal is the estimation of parameters measuring the 
degree of competition (1982, p.1 014). 
The results are very consistent across estimations. In broad terms the 
implications of the analyses are as follows: the rate paid for each type of deposit 
specified in basis points, is decreasing in concentration. Furthermore, the rate 
paid on deposits is decreasing in the cost proxy in the form of wages and scale 
variables such as total assets. The latter implies that larger banks offer lower 
deposit rates to their customers, all else equal (Hannan, 1997, p. 32). 
The inclusion of an alternative competitive cost funding variable in the form of the 
interbank lending rate (JIBAR) reveals that the basis point reduction is not as 
high on deposit rates as in the absence of the variable. The average basis point 
reduction is only 24.1 when the JIBAR rate is included compared to 77.4 BP in 
the absence thereof using CR4 as measure for market structure. 
The analysis across deposit types reveals interesting patterns. The 32 day notice 
deposit account (ND32) generally declines by a greater magnitude (see Table 4) 
relative to the 12 month fixed deposit instrument (FD12) even when the interbank 
lending rate JIBAR is included in the regression. 
The coefficient of total assets is very small and turns out mostly statistically 
significant, therefore the contention that larger banks offer lower deposit rates 
seems to be supported by the results, dummy variables tests using a BIG4 
dummy also support this contention (results not shown here). The coefficient for 
total market deposits growth gives consistently negative coefficients implying that 
greater supply of funds to the industry confers greater market power. These 











sources are included. Increased per person income increases the pool of funds 
available probably due to greater disposable income making it more cost 
effective for banks to manage deposit funds, it marginally raises the rate paid and 
the coefficient is statistically significant. 
The results support the SCP paradigm since it implies that higher concentration 
of market demand deposits results in lower interest rates on consumer deposits, 
ceteris paribus. The coefficient on the market structure variable (CR4) is highly 
statistically significant and negative for all types of deposit accounts. The rates 
paid on deposit accounts decline by between 20.0 BP when the interbank lending 
rate is included to 77.4 BP. Thus, following a 10% increase in market 
concentration one can expect the rate paid to decline by anything between 0.10% 
and 1.00%, all else equal. 
The specification tests are valid overall with the F-statistics obtained indicating 
thus. Gilbert (1984, p. 626) in his survey paper reported results from several 
papers? on the response of bank performance measures to changes in the 
market concentration ratio. These studies reported declines ranging between 
0.05 and 18 basis points on interest paid on time (fixed) and savings deposits. 
In terms of other explanatory variables, the coefficient for market per capita 
income (PCINC) is positive, statistically significant at the 5 percent level but is 
relatively small in magnitude. Increasing per capita income raises the rate earned 
by individuals on savings deposit instruments held with banks. The local financial 
institutions' wage index is, as expected, negative implying that increasing costs 
narrows the scope for price competitiveness as banks try to maintain margins. 
Therefore, banks have to lower the rates paid on deposits in the case that the 
cost structure of the business evolves i.e. greater costs assuming no 
accompanying labour and technology efficiency improvements. It should be 












pointed out that the cost proxy in the form of wages does not nearly capture the 
total cost structure of banking and therefore does not account for the overall 
impact. 
Hannan (1991) formalised the predictions of the SCP hypothesis and showed 
that all else equal, the expected sign on the coefficients for market structure 
proxies and market share respectively are negative with respect to deposit rates. 
Furthermore, the rate offered for each type of deposit is increasing in the security 
rate, decreasing in the marginal costs associated with handling deposits and 
increasing in the elasticity of supply of deposit funds. 
The author shows that deposit rates paid are decreasing in concentrationS, which 
is consistent with our empirical findings using both measures of market 
concentration, CR4 and HHI respectively. The cost proxy in the form of the 
financial services sector average monthly salaries turned out negative as 
predicted by Hannan. If per capita income proxies for the elasticity of supply of 
deposit funds, then the sign of this variable is also consistent with the theoretical 
prediction. 











6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The study analysed the relationship between interest rates paid on consumer 
deposits and the structure of the South African banking market, or price-
concentration relationships. Not much formal analysis has been conducted prior 
to this for the local banking market and this study aims to contribute towards an 
understanding of the determinants of banks' conduct and performance. 
Okeahalam emphasises the need for better measures of efficiency to determine 
what the factors are that influence the relatively good performance of local banks. 
In the light of this and the results of this study, one can conclude that market 
concentration and the relatively protected environment under which banks 
operate are determinants of bank deposit rate setting. This price setting is 
generally less favourable to consumers in that banks pay lower rates on deposit 
accounts (the results show reductions ranging from 0.10% to 1.00% on average) 
as a result of the market power that they wield. Assuming an average rate over 
the period of 11.4% (see mean 32 day notice deposit rate, Table 2), deposit 
instruments paid anything between 11.3% and 10.4% on average, ceteris 
paribus. 
The results of the study have shown that the coefficient for market structure (CR4 
and HHI) is negative and highly statistically significant (see regression output). 
This is the case both when we employ the CR4 and HHI respectively as proxies 
for market concentration, such that higher market concentration gives rise to 
lower deposit rates having controlled for the interbank lending rate. This implies 
that greater concentration has negative welfare consequences for consumers of 
banking deposit products. 
The inclusion of the interbank lending rate, to account for alternative competitive 











remaining explanatory variables also explain significant structural aspects of the 
market and firm-specific factors. 
The policy implications of the study relate to the impact of industry structures on 
the competitive behaviour of firms and consumer welfare and efficiency 
considerations emanating from that. The public interest considerations for 
competition policy and distributional considerations following from market power 
effects are important to competition authorities. The Competition Act, Act No. 12 
of 1998, states that an "efficient, competitive economic environment, balancing 
the interests of workers, owners and consumers and focused on development, 
will benefit all South Africans". The considerations of the Act and the prevalence 
of large profits that could potentially be attributed to an uncompetitive economic 
environment make this a pertinent public policy issue. 
The relevance of formally establishing a relationship between structure and 
conduct in a particular industry sector that influences pricing decisions and social 
welfare could be of value to the work of the competition authorities. Other 
industries can also benefit in terms of the analysis of industry pricing and/or cost 
structures and the relationship with market structure. Furthermore, the recent 
criticism by the Governor of the SARB on banks' 3.5% margin convention is a 
case in point9 . These policy implications should however take into consideration 
the systemic risks posed to the financial system of an unregulated or under-
regulated industry and the unique role of banks in the economy both from a 
social and economic viewpoint. 
The deterioration in savings in the South African economy is a challenge that the 
political authorities are quite concerned about1O . A possibility for further research 
areas could be the determination of the interrelationships between aggregate 
savings in the economy and the (dis) incentives framework for household 
9 Financial Mail, 10 February 2006 
10 The national savings rate as a percentage of gross domestic product is quoted at around 13% 











savings. The latter relates to the margin commercial banks earn and the deposit 
rates they offer on different deposit instruments and the role of market structure 
could be an important determinant in this regard. 
The results of the study should be qualified in the light of the criticisms of the 
SCP raised in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. Notwithstanding these 
qualifications, some studies (see Fourie and Smith, 1998, p. 271) have found 
firms in consumer good industries (e.g. retail deposits market) showed stronger 
discretionary pricing decisions because buyers in consumer good industries 
typically have weaker bargaining positions, this contention renders the findings of 
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